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SOFT LAW, HARD MARKETS:
COMPETITIVE SELF-INTEREST AND THE
EMERGENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
Ralph G. Steinhardt*
INTRODUCTION

D

o multinational corporations have enforceable obligations to protect international human rights? If they do, two principles lying at
the foundations of two traditionally separate bodies of law—corporate
law and international human rights law—must be reconceived and reconciled. In corporate law, the bedrock principle of shareholder primacy
requires a corporation’s directors and officers to maximize the return on
their shareholders’ investment.1 One dominant critique of the corporate
responsibility initiative suggests that it subverts shareholder primacy by
requiring management to develop an expertise in human rights law and
exercise de facto control over abuses generally committed by governments, raising costs without raising revenues.2 In international human
rights law, the bedrock principle of state responsibility traditionally
places a comprehensive obligation on governments to protect human
rights and either imposes no obligations on non-state actors like corporations or imposes obligations only in extraordinary circumstances defined
by international agreement. From that perspective, the corporate human
* Arthur Selwyn Miller Research Professor of Law and Director of the Oxford Program in International Human Rights Law, George Washington University Law School.
J.D. (Harvard University); B.A. (Bowdoin College). I am grateful to Stephen Walls for
his splendid and spirited research assistance. Special thanks to the editors and staff of the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law.
1. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers
of the directors are to be employed for that end.”). See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 rep. note 1 (Am. Law Inst.
1994) (“Some cases, mostly arising before the turn of the century, applied the concept
reflected in Dodge v. Ford, a strict notion of ultra vires, or both, to strictly preclude the
utilization of corporate resources, either by way of donation or otherwise, for humanitarian, educational, philanthropic, or public welfare activities.”).
2. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 133 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) (1962) (“Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials
of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as
possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine.”).
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rights initiative dilutes the “state primacy” principle and poses a controversial distraction from the already daunting task of getting government
actors to take human rights law seriously.
In contemporary corporate and international law, the doctrines of
shareholder supremacy3 and state responsibility4 have lost their simple
rigidity, but a puzzle persists: in what circumstances—if any—may civil
or criminal liability be imposed on a company for violating human rights
standards, and how—if at all—will those obligations be enforced?
I have previously argued that the emerging standards of corporate responsibility rest on four separate but compatible regimes of doctrine and
practice, each with its own characteristic modes of enforcement:5 (i) a
market-based regime,6 or “human rights entrepreneurialism,” under
which corporations compete for consumers and investors by conforming
to international human rights standards; (ii) a regime of domestic regulation,7 exemplified by sanctions or boycott legislation, which channels
3. The shareholder primacy principle, insofar as it reflected an assumption that corporate altruism is inherently unprofitable, has been qualified considerably:
(a) . . . a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business: (1) is obliged, to the same extent as
a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law; (2) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the
responsible conduct of business, and (3) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
1, at 55. A contemporary, progressive stream of corporate law scholarship rests on the
“concern about the harm to nonshareholders that can occur as a result of managerial adherence to the shareholder primacy principle. Efforts to maximize shareholder wealth are
often costly to nonshareholders and often come at the expense of particular nonshareholder constituent groups.” David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 1 (Lawrence
Mitchell ed., Westview Press 1995).
4. For at least twenty years, governments have had the obligation, especially under
the regional human rights systems, to protect against human rights abuses by non-state
actors. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE
ACTORS 347–436 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
5. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177–
226 (Philip Alston ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005). Part III of this Article replicates this
prior work.
6. Id. at 180.
7. Id. at 187.
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corporate behavior to advance a rights-based foreign policy; (iii) a regime of civil liability,8 enforced through private lawsuits in domestic
courts and exemplified in the United States by actions under the Alien
Tort Statute (“ATS”),9 such as the Holocaust litigation10 and the Unocal
case;11 and (iv) a regime of international regulation and quasiregulation12 by both intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, based on a variety of international instruments of varying formality and legal status, in order to minimize the role
that multinational corporations play in the violation of human rights.
These four regimes do not preclude the evolution of other approaches
to corporate responsibility,13 nor do they operate independently of one
another: developments in one regime have direct effects in another. Nor
is there any argument that the law of corporate human rights responsibility is fully formed and operable in any of these four areas. But the coherence of these developments with one another suggests that contemporary
analysts—whether corporate counsel or human rights advocates, not to
8. Id. at 194.
9. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (descendants of Jewish customers of French financial institutions sued for damages, alleging
conspiracy to expropriate assets and failure to disgorge these assets to their rightful owners post-Holocaust); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999)
(class action brought against German corporations, seeking damages for enforced labor
during the Holocaust and for oppressive living and working conditions).
11. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003).
12. Steinhardt, supra note 5, at 202.
13. It is conceivable for example that a regime of corporate criminal responsibility is
in prospect, as several papers in this Symposium suggest. Ronald C. Slye, Corporations,
Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955 (2008); Jonathan
Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human Rights Abuses,
33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 899 (2008). See also Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 22,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007). In particular,
the Special Representative noted the following:
[C]orporate responsibility is being shaped through the interplay of two developments: one is the expansion and refinement of individual responsibility by the international ad hoc criminal tribunals and the . . . . Statute [of the International
Criminal Court]; the other is the extension of responsibility for international crimes
to corporations under domestic law. The complex interaction between the two is
creating an expanding web of potential corporate liability for international crimes,
imposed through national courts.
Id.
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mention scholars of international law and corporate law—should not ignore or minimize this recent history.
Other participants in this Symposium have focused on the power and
the limits of the three regimes that are in principle the most coercive:
domestic regulation, civil liability, and international regulation.14 In this
Article, I argue that the least coercive regime—the free and competitive
marketplace—also serves as a means of enforcing the emerging standards of corporate responsibility, although my conception of enforcement may initially appeal more to devotees of Adam Smith than to lawyers.15 The argument is that the law protecting the freedom of competition allows companies to compete with one another by implementing
human rights policies and by adopting industry-wide statements of best
human rights practices. History suggests that these best practices, beginning perhaps as voluntary or aspirational guidelines, can assume a more
authoritative cast over time and become the best available measure of a
company’s due diligence and fair dealing.16 The evolution may be gradual and atomistic (e.g., through individual civil claims against noncomplying companies for unfair business practices or false advertising),
or it may be coordinated through legislation with general application
(e.g., through “comply or explain” directives designed to increase market
transparency by maximizing information to consumers, investors, and
other businesses).17
The modes by which law emerges from the conduct of corporations in
the marketplace may vary, the timing may not be linear or uniform, and
progress—however defined—may not always be discernible. However,
history offers a tolerable parallel in the medieval and renaissance lex
mercatoria, the law merchant, which originated in the long-term, mutual,
and sophisticated self-interest of the entrepreneurial class and which
gradually became codified in the commercial law of states, ultimately
emerging as a form of contemporary transnational law. As this Article
14. Nicola M.C.P. Jägers & Marie-José van der Heijden, Corporate Human Rights
Violations: The Feasibility of Civil Recourse in the Netherlands, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
833 (2008); Anthony J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute, 33
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871 (2008).
15. See infra note 61.
16. See infra Part III.
17. The “comply or explain” principle has become a feature of Europe’s approach to
corporate governance. The governance codes in the various member states articulate
norms or recommendations that may not be mandatory, but companies must either comply with these norms or explain publicly why they are not complying with them. See
Statement of the European Corporate Governance Forum on the Comply-or-Explain
Principle (Feb, 22, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-comply-explain_en.pdf (last visited May 31, 2008).
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will illustrate, commercial law has characteristically developed from the
bottom up, following a distinctive normative trajectory, evolving from
competitive practices into commercial customs and expectations, then
transforming into the soft law netherworld of principles or model contracts, and finally taking shape as law. In short, norms that corporations
themselves consider to be in their competitive self-interest may ratchet
towards normativity and become more recognizably law-like.
The emerging norms of corporate responsibility in matters of human
rights can and should be understood in light of this ancient dynamic: substantively and chronologically, the law merchant followed mercantile
custom rather than creating, defining, coercing, displacing, or preempting it. From this perspective, the voluntary or aspirational undertakings of entrepreneurs are not only consistent with the emergence of legal
obligations; they propel and refine them. In addition, appreciating this
historical trajectory has certain practical consequences for the contemporary practice of law. Quite apart from understanding how legal obligations evolve from business cultures, the lex mercatoria paradigm of corporate human rights responsibility suggests that the distinctions that
structure the current debate—between, for example, voluntary aspirations and mandatory obligations, between state and non-state actors, or
between public international law and private international law—radically
oversimplify the issues.
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I advances a modest empirical claim that multinational corporations have increasingly declared
their commitment to human rights standards (or some substantial subset
of them) and that they increasingly compete for customers and investors
in this mode. Part II makes a normative claim that the justifications for
this “human rights entrepreneurialism” are multiple and mutually reinforcing. Part III advances the analytical claim that links the emerging
rules of a corporation’s best human rights practice to the ancient lex mercatoria.
I. THE EMPIRICAL CLAIM: HUMAN RIGHTS ENTREPRENEURIALISM
Many multinational corporations now voluntarily proclaim some
commitment to human rights, even if the record of their compliance is
mixed. These unilateral and voluntary commitments take various forms,
including corporate codes of conduct, which articulate and standardize
the company’s business practices. The codification initiative began in the
anti-apartheid18 and pro-environment19 movements, but has grown to
18. The Sullivan Principles, first articulated in 1977 and ultimately incorporated by
President Reagan into Executive Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36861 (Sept. 9, 1985),
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address a variety of human rights concerns, like security operations, corruption, freedom of association, discrimination, child labor, and forced
labor of any sort. A handful of firms—especially petroleum companies,
the largest corporations in the world—have even pegged corporate policy
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,20 suggesting that the
companies were aligning themselves with traditionally governmental
obligations that go well beyond the rights of workers.21
amounted to a voluntary code of conduct for companies doing business in South Africa
during the apartheid regime. The principles required certain human rights practices, like
integrated workplaces, fair employment, and affirmative action. They also gave companies an objective, common, and auditable standard under which their presence in South
Africa might be defended in the competition for a good corporate image. In 1984, with
some 125 signatories, the principles were expanded to require companies to take more
aggressive action against apartheid, tantamount to corporate civil disobedience. The
principles also provided a benchmark for the managers of municipal pension funds and
university endowments, and served as the model for the MacBride Principles for companies doing business in Northern Ireland. By 1987, with only glacial change in South Africa, even the drafters of the Sullivan Principles considered them a failure and urged corporations to withdraw from South Africa altogether.
19. In 1989, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”)
adopted the Valdez Principles, which required signatory companies to adopt a variety
of green practices to protect the biosphere by using renewable resources, disposing
of wastes properly, disclosing environmental risks, and submitting to an annual
environmental audit. Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies [C.E.R.E.S.]
Principles, http://www.ceres.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=416&srcid=811 (last
visited May 18, 2008).
20. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an authoritative articulation of
governments’ human rights responsibilities under the United Nations Charter. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948). See also INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 143–64 (Richard Lillich et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2006).
21. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Corporation, Corporate Responsibility Policy (2002),
http://www.hess.com/downloads/documents/pdf/csrpolicy.pdf; Chevron Corporation,
Human Rights Statement (2006), http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevronhuman
rightsstatement.pdf. See also The Body Shop, Human Rights Principles (2006),
http://www.thebodyshopinternational.com/NR/rdonlyres/023A7009-1E1A-4305-9BA9F1845F1EA038/0/Humanrightsprinciples.pdf. This instrument states:
As a global business, we respect local, cultural and political differences, but
will always insist that our business activities adhere to basic human rights, as
enshrined in the Universal Declaration for Human Rights. We will assess all
our business activities to determine where we have direct or indirect impacts,
ensure compliance with human rights legislation and strive to have a positive
impact on our stakeholders and on society at large. We will use objectively
measurable standards that reflect internationally recognised human rights standards and conventions.
Id. at 1.
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These voluntary, unilateral codes of conduct characteristically address
the business-to-business relationships of a company with its suppliers
and vendors. For example, Levis Strauss & Co. (“LS & Co.”), in its
Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines, declared that it “favor[s]
business partners who share our commitment to contribute to improving
community conditions” and it “require[s] that [contractors] implement a
corrective action plan within a specified time period” if “a contractor is
not complying with [LS & Co.’s Business Partner Terms of Engagement].”22 Moreover, in its Country Assessment Guidelines, LS & Co.
articulated the criteria it would apply to determine whether doing business in a particular country was harming its competitiveness and profitability, including whether the human rights environment would prevent
the company from “conduct[ing] business activities in a manner that is
consistent with [LS & Co.’s] Global Sourcing Guidelines and other company policies.”23
Equally prominent are rights-sensitive certification and branding initiatives in a variety of industries that purport to offer consumers some assurance that the products they buy were not produced in ways that violate
the rights of workers or broader communities. When, for example, the
World Diamond Council realized that the world market for diamonds
was undermined by consumer fears of conflict diamonds, it developed
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (“Kimberley Process”), a
public-private partnership for developing an auditable certification protocol to assure buyers that profits from the sale of gems would not support governments or paramilitary groups that violate the human rights of
civilians in conflict zones.24 By design, the Kimberley Process served the
specific commercial goal of “protect[ing the legitimate diamond indus-

22. Levi Strauss & Co., Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines, http://www.levi
strauss.com/Downloads/GSOG.pdf (last visited May 18, 2008).
23. Id.
24. World Diamond Council, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com (follow “Resolutions” hyperlink; then follow
“Kimberley Process Certification Scheme” hyperlink) (last visited May 18, 2008). The
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has been specifically approved by the United
Nations in recognition that it:
[C]an help to ensure the effective implementation of relevant resolutions of the
Security Council containing sanctions on the trade in conflict diamonds and act
as a mechanism for the prevention of future conflicts, and calls for the full implementation of existing Council measures targeting the illicit trade in rough
diamonds, particularly conflict diamonds which play a role in fuelling conflict.
G.A. Res. 62/11, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/62/L.16 (Nov. 21, 2007).
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try,”25 and now covers the overwhelming bulk of the world’s trade in
diamonds.26 Similarly, coffee retailers, like Starbucks, routinely offer
“fair trade” coffees through the Coffee and Farmer Equity Practices
(“C.A.F.E.”) program, guaranteeing on every cup that the production and
marketing of its products did not harm workers or the environment.27
Like the Kimberley Process, the C.A.F.E program may target the retail
consumer, but it also regulates business-to-business relationships in the
supply chain. The apparel industry has also adopted various workplace
codes of conduct and monitoring protocols to structure a business relationship in order to assure customers that sweatshop practices are reduced or stopped altogether.28 Chiquita Brands International sought to
market an “Ethical Banana” by adopting an auditable social and environmental standard for its farms in Latin America, under the Better Banana Project (“BBP”) of the Rainforest Alliance.29 Similarly, in the extractive industry, where private security operations have frequently led to
human rights violations, a unique partnership of government representatives, corporate officers, and human rights activists has developed a voluntary system to minimize the risk of violations.30
There have also been efforts to define a common measure of corporate
compliance, to standardize the unilateral codes of conduct, and to offer
the consumer a readily identifiable mark at the point of purchase. The
25. International Trade: Significant Challenges Remain in Deterring Trade in Conflict Diamonds, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-02-425T, at 6 (2002) (statement of Loren Yager, Director, International Affairs and Trade), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/021302yager.pdf.
26. For more information on the ongoing successes of the Kimberley Process, see
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
27. For more information about the C.A.F.E. practices, see SCS Collaboration with
Starbucks Coffee to Create the C.A.F.E. Practices Program, http://www.scscertified.
com/csrpurchasing/starbucks.html (last visited May 18, 2008).
28. See, e.g., The Fair Labor Ass’n, Workplace Code of Conduct,
http://www.fairlabor.org/var/uploads/File/The%20Fair%20Labor%20Association%20Wo
rkplace%20Code%20of%20Conduct.pdf (last visited May 18, 2008); The Fair Labor
Association, Principles of Monitoring, http://www.fairlabor.org/docs/FLA_PRINCIPLES
_OF_MONITORING.pdf (last visited May 18, 2008); The Clean Clothes Campaign,
Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry Including Sportswear,
http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/index.htm (last visited May 18, 2008).
29. Rainforest Alliance, Profiles in Sustainable Agriculture: Chiquita Reaps a Better
Banana (2005), http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/programs/profiles/documents/chiquita
profile.pdf; Chiquita Banana, Better Banana Project: Working for the Environment
(2007), http://www.chiquita.com/discover/owbetter.asp.
30. See Bennett Freeman, Maria B. Pica & Christopher N. Camponovo, A New Approach to Corporate Responsibility: The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423 (2001).
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most developed of these efforts is Social Accountability (“SA”) 8000
(“SA 8000”), a voluntary protocol under which independent auditors certify that a company complies with human rights standards derived from,
inter alia, International Labour Organisation conventions, the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child.31 Nine specific areas are identified in the SA 8000 standard:
child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association, freedom from discrimination, disciplinary practices, work hours, compensation, and management systems to assure compliance.32 Like other auditable standards, including ISO 9000 on quality control and ISO 14001 on
environmental management, SA 8000 and its cognates33 allow certified
companies to differentiate themselves from their uncertified competitors.34 Since its introduction, SA 8000 has come to cover hundreds of
thousands of workers and thousands of factories in scores of countries,
altering the essential commercial relationship between a company and its
suppliers.
Human rights concerns are also present in the investment market: over
the last decade, individual and institutional investors have adopted social
or ethical criteria to screen their initial investments and to guide their
votes as stockholders once the investment is made. The typical target of
shareholder activism has been sustainable business,35 of which human
rights responsibility is one component. The dominant investment houses
have also marketed ethical-investment mutual funds, and the major stock
markets have developed social indices to guide investors with human
31. Social Accountability International, Overview of SA 8000, http://www.saintl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageID=473 (last visited June 1, 2008).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., European Union [E.U.] Eco-Label Scheme, http://ec.europa.eu/envir
onment/ecolabel/whats_eco/ov_concept_en.htm (last visited May 18, 2008); Fairtrade
Foundation, http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/what_is_fairtrade/fairtrade_foundation.aspx (last
visited May 18, 2008); G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, http://www.global
reporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE1-BFF25F735235CA44/0/G3_Guide
linesENU.pdf (last visited May 18, 2008).
34. Problems with implementing the SA 8000 persist, and the system may rest on the
fiction of quantifying the unquantifiable (and auditing it) or finding a consumer with
perfect information who is not driven exclusively by considerations of price. See generally Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply Chain:
Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
321 (2007).
35. Tim Dickson, The Financial Case for Behaving Responsibly, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2002, at 5 (defining sustainable business as behavior “that enhances long-term shareholder value by addressing the needs of all relevant stakeholders and adding economic,
environmental, and social value through its core business functions”). See also Louisa
Wah, Treading the Sacred Ground, 87 MGMT. REV. 18–22 (1998).
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rights concerns.36 An entire ethical consulting industry has also arisen in
order to assist companies manage risk by adhering to the norms of corporate citizenship.
These examples could be multiplied, but even this overview suggests
that companies routinely perceive a competitive advantage in offering
rights-sensitive product lines and branding, even if limits on the effectiveness of these initiatives remain clear.37 Indeed, the proliferation of
these commitments can be traced to the competitive demands placed on a
corporation, including the need to attract consumers and investors. However, it also rests on the company’s need to develop sustainable business
relationships in the marketplace. Business groups, like the Chamber of
Commerce and the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, regularly report on the best practices of their members across industrial sectors, in dozens of countries, implicating a broad range of human rights
concerns.38 The commercial advantages of human rights entrepreneurialism are clearly not lost on successful competitors.
II. THE NORMATIVE CLAIM: TOWARDS A UNIFIED PRINCIPLE OF
JUSTIFICATION
It is one thing to observe that multinational corporations have increasingly taken on some public commitment to the protection of human
rights. It is quite another to argue that corporations should take these
commitments on, especially when governments continue to bear primary
responsibility at law for the protection of individuals’ human rights. After all, the multinational corporation may be better conceived as a bearer
of rights than as a bearer of obligations in this arena. In this Part, after
identifying the three principal categories of justifications—
consequentialist, deontological, and positivist—I argue that the theoreti-

36. See, e.g., Dow Jones STOXX Sustainability Index, http://www.sustainabilityindexes.com (last visited May 18, 2008); FTSE4Good Index, http://www.ftse4good.com
(last visited May 18, 2008). These indices are only partial indicators of human rights
practices because they include only particular areas of corporate responsibility, some of
which have little to do with human rights.
37. See generally Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights
Standards Through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 111 (1998).
38. Examples of such reports produced by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights can be found on their respective Web sites.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Reports and Studies, http://www.uschamber.
com/publications/reports/default (last visited May 18, 2008); Business Leaders Initiative
on Human Rights, Reports and Tools, http://www.blihr.org/ (follow “Reports & Tools”
hyperlink) (last visited May 18, 2008).
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cal rationales for accepting these obligations (or having them imposed)
are multiple and reinforcing.
Consequentialism. A purely consequentialist justification suggests that
it is in the long-term self-interest of the corporation to bring its practices
into conformity with at least some subset of human rights standards. The
orthodox rationale for consequentialism is that a company suffers in
capital markets if its shares lose value in an increasingly sociallyconscious investment environment, and it suffers in the retail market via
consumer choices at the point of purchase (including boycotts). With the
rise of ATS litigation against corporate defendants, it may increasingly
suffer in a courtroom. The dominant rationale offered by corporations
that have voluntarily adopted human rights policies is the market reliability rationale: to the extent that respect for human rights correlates with a
commitment to the rule of law, the corporation should choose the more
ordered, and therefore more profitable, environment. The commercial
case for corporate human rights responsibility compliance has been articulated by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights:
(1) [Ensuring] Compliance with both Local and International Laws . . . .
(2) Satisfying Consumer Concerns . . . .
(3) Promoting the Rule of Law . . . .
(4) Building Community Goodwill . . . .
(5) [Improving] Supply Chain Management . . . .
(6) Enhancing Risk Management . . . .
(7) Keeping Markets Open . . . .
(8) Increasing Worker Productivity and Retention . . . .
(9) Applying Corporate Values[] . . . in ways that . . . . [maintain] the
faith of employees and external stakeholders in company integrity.39

Market players confirm this dynamic. For example, the former President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong observed:
[W]hile it might not always be the case that trade and business are good
for human rights, it most certainly is the case that a good human rights
environment is always good for business. Businesses are acting in their

39. U.N. High Commission for Human Rights’ Presentation for the Annual Meeting
of the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switz., Jan. 2000, Business and Human Rights: A
Progress Report, Part I, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/business.htm#I1.
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own self-interest when they actively promote respect for human rights
in countries where they operate.40

Deontological approaches. A second principle of justification is classically deontological and grounded in the natural law conception of
rights.41 In this view, human beings have rights simply by virtue of being
human, regardless of whether these rights have been articulated in positive law or not, and no one (natural or juridical) is immune from the obligation to respect and protect those rights. From that perspective, the
burden of persuasion rests on those who would exclude corporations
from the human rights initiative, rather than on those who would include
them. The carve-out from human rights obligations for corporations becomes especially problematic as more government operations—like security, the conduct of armed conflict, and the running of prisons—are
privatized. Governments cannot privatize their way out of international
legal obligations to protect human rights. The delegation of public authority to a nominally private actor cannot relieve the government of its
international legal obligations. Entities, both public and private, should
be held accountable if human rights are abused in the exercise of government functions, regardless of who—or what—is performing them.
Positivism. A third rationale is essentially positivistic, as that term of
art is understood in international law (referring to the practice of states,
including the adoption of treaties).42 International law has recognized
40. John Kamm, The Role of Businesses in Promoting Respect for Human Rights in
China, INT’L BUS. ETHICS REV., Nov. 1, 1997, available at http://www.businessethics.org/newsdetail.asp?newsid=30. Experience over the past decade confirms that the
market reliability rationale (and similarly consequentialist arguments) continues to be a
dominant public justification for bringing human rights concerns into the corporate decision-making process. E.g., Beyond the “Genocide Olympics”, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24,
2008, available at http://www.economist.com/business/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=
11090045 (last visited May 30, 2008) (“What is striking today is how often activists, big
firms and governments are now in agreement about the importance of human rights, and
are working together to advance them.”). See generally DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR
VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (Brookings
Institution Press 2005).
41. See generally PATRICK HAYDEN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3–10 (Paragon House 2001).
42. Since the time of Grotius, the traditional basis for international legal obligations
has been the consent of states, expressed through treaties and custom. “Positivism” at
international law refers to the process by which states generate international law in these
forms, generally out of a sense of their national interest. FERNANDO R. TESON, A
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (Westview Press 1998) (“[P]ositivism rests on
two pillars: national interest and state consent.”). For a general overview of traditional
ethical approaches to decision-making by multinational corporations, see THOMAS
DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (Oxford Univ. Press 1989).
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two separate circumstances under which a nominally private actor might
nonetheless bear international responsibility: first, a narrow class of per
se wrongs identified by treaty and custom that are unlawful even in the
absence of state action, and second, a broader class of offensive conduct
that is sufficiently infused with state action to engage international standards.
The wrongs in the first category are identified in treaty regimes that
prohibit certain human rights violations and explicitly override the state
action requirement. For example, the Genocide Convention requires that
persons committing genocide be punished, “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”43 Certain aspects of the war crimes regime of the Geneva Convention, especially common article 3, similarly bind non-state actors when they are
parties to an international armed conflict.44 The prohibition on slavery is
quintessentially aimed at acts by individuals in a market setting and is
unlawful whether there is state action or not.45 The International Law
Commission (“ILC”), which was directed by the United Nations General
Assembly to codify the Nuremberg principles, has never required state
action for wrongs in this category. Indeed, in 1985, the ILC rejected a
draft that would have limited liability to “State authorities” in favor of a
draft making all individuals who commit an “offence against the peace
and security of mankind” liable.46 Routine commercial activity by multinational corporations does not typically fall into this class, of course, but
there is no prophylactic rule that corporations are in principle immune
from liability for acts that do come within these treaty regimes.
It is equally clear that multinational corporations cannot be immune
from human rights obligations for their state-like or state-related activities. In order words, there may be corporate conduct that falls into the
second category of non-state liability, namely conduct that becomes internationally wrongful by virtue of the actor’s relationship with a state. In
this theory, a mere contractual relationship with a government that com43. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021.
44. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135.
45. See Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of
Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 1, 31–2 (2004) (discussing the Unocal case and how “the law of nations attributes
individual liability [for engaging in forced labor, the ‘modern variant of slavery’] such
that state action is not required”).
46. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1985] 2 Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n 7, A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.l (Part 2), at 14, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1985_v2_p2_e.pdf.
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mits human rights violations should be insufficient to trigger liability—
moral agency theory does not revoke the law of proximate cause. However, a private actor that fulfills a government function or is in a business
relationship with a government that requires human rights violations for
profit should satisfy the standard. And both international and domestic
law articulate aiding-and-abetting standards that cover both juristic and
natural individuals.47
Positivism, like the deontological approach, shifts the burden of proof:
because the law treats both human beings and corporations as individuals, the burden of justification falls to those who carve out an exception
for companies. A related positivist rationale would not consider the practice of states internationally but rather the standard company law of most
municipal legal systems, which provides a crucial quid pro quo: companies receive from the state the benefit of incorporation, meaning the right
to exist and to limit the liability of stockholders to the extent of their investment, and, in exchange for that considerable and profitable right,
they can be expected to serve the public interest and not abuse their
privileges.48
The common principle in these positivist approaches is the understanding that international law is not different in kind from other sources of
obligation for the modern corporation. It is well-established that a corporation might be liable in tort for damages caused by the negligence or
intentional acts of its employees,49 that a corporation can violate the
property rights of others and be required to pay damages or to obey an
injunction, and that a corporation can be guilty of criminal offenses including conspiracy and aiding and abetting,50 The human rights norms
47. The predictable variation at the margins of the international aiding-and-abetting
standard—whether within international institutions or among the municipal legal systems
around the world—does not undermine its core denotation. In United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. 153 (1820), the Supreme Court had to determine the international definition of piracy, and the Court discerned a lowest common denominator among the practice of states
and the scholarly consensus. Specifically, the Court acknowledged controversy in some
particulars but concluded that “whatever may be the diversity of definitions in other respects, all writers concur in holding that robbery or forcible depredations upon the sea,
animo furandi [i.e., with the intention to steal] is piracy.” Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
48. See DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY 27–28 (N.Y.U. Press
2001) (arguing that U.S. state legislatures historically imputed a duty upon corporations
to serve the public interest in every undertaking and in no way viewed them as merely
vehicles of profit).
49. See FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A CONCISE TREATISE 145–47
(Charles K. Burdick ed., Banks & Co. 4th ed. 1926). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
50. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE CORPORATE LITIGATOR 643 (Francis J. Burke, Jr.
& Michael Goldblatt eds., 1989).
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imposed on, or undertaken by, the corporation are similarly compatible
with their juristic status.
III. THE ANALYTICAL CLAIM: THROUGH THE LENS OF LEX MERCATORIA
The history of the law merchant is that best commercial practices
started as a form of spontaneous or voluntary order and, if they survived,
gradually became codified in the commercial law of states,51 evolving
ultimately into international trade law and the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.52 Contemporary scholars have
prolonged a hundred years war over whether the lex mercatoria existed
independently of municipal law and what its substantive norms—if
any—were.53 There is, however, a wide consensus that the law in its
positivist forms eventually replicated certain customary practices at the
heart of an effective and ethical transnational business order.
In the sources and content of norms governing corporate responsibility,
it is possible to see the emergence of a new lex mercatoria—a contemporary variant of the medieval and renaissance law merchant. The lex mercatoria was developed and enforced as a tool to promote better business
practices through offers of security to consumers and other merchants.
The lex mercatoria also served an interstitial role, filling the gaps of each
jurisdiction’s commercial law and harmonizing disparate approaches in
51. Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221 (1978) (noting that certain widespread similarities in legal doctrines governing the allocation of risk of loss or damage to
goods, standard clauses in bills of lading or letters of credit, and arbitration clauses are
“due in part to common commercial needs shared by all who participate in international
trade transactions”). See also WYNDHAM A. BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW
MERCHANT 28–62 (1923) (demonstrating that certain doctrines of contemporary commercial law can be traced through the law merchant and ultimately to medieval business
customs, including the enforceability of informal agreements, the rights of a possessor of
a bearer bill of exchange, the protection of the good faith purchaser of stolen goods even
against the original owner when the goods were bought in the “open market,” the right of
a seller to stop the transit of goods if the buyer defaults after shipment, and the right of
partners to an accounting). Accord LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 25–26, 33 (1983) (describing similarities between the
ancient lex mercatoria and the modern Uniform Commercial Code in the United States).
52. Cf. John Honnold, The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Development and Character of English and American Commercial Law, in THE SOURCES OF
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 70, 76 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1964).
53. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of
the Law Merchant: Reflections on the Historical Origins and Economic Structure of the
Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early
Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21
(2004).
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different markets and nations. The law’s genesis in the customs of the
marketplace
was by far the most decisive factor in its development: it made the law
eminently a practical law adapted to the requirements of commerce;
and as trade expanded and new forms of commercial activity arose—
negotiable paper, insurance, etc.—custom everywhere fashioned and
framed the broad general principles of the new law. Custom is alike the
ruling principle and the originating force of the Law Merchant.54

In this way, the lex mercatoria became one model for innovation in the
introduction of new legal principles and doctrines, originating and evolving from the initiative of merchants who were motivated by a long-term,
sophisticated, and mutual self-interest. As a result, key entrepreneurial
concepts and practices found their way into the commercial law of
states—and ultimately into contemporary international trade law and the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The
international legal order thereby replicated and formalized the ethical
business order, rather than displacing, coercing, or pre-empting it.55
But there were more than merely utilitarian reasons for the emergence
and the stability of lex mercatoria: the influence of canon law tended to
inject transnational standards of good faith and equity into commercial
dealings as well:
Canon law, the body of universal law and procedure developed by the
[Roman Catholic] Church for its own governance and to regulate the
rights and obligations of its communicants, had from the beginning its
own sphere of application and separate courts. . . . [But] there was a
tendency towards overlapping jurisdiction, and before the Reformation
it was common to find ecclesiastical courts exercising civil jurisdiction.56

54. WILLIAM MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT
12 (1904).
55. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS (2000). Incoterms
is a source of international uniform definitions for commercial delivery terms, which
defines the obligations of sellers and buyers regarding shipment and receipt of goods.
Because its publisher, the International Chamber of Commerce, is a non-governmental
entity, Incoterms does not have the legally binding effect of an international treaty. But it
does provide a written expression of custom and usage—or best practice—in the industry. Parties to international transactions often expressly incorporate Incoterms into their
contracts, and even when they do not, courts will occasionally incorporate them. RALPH
FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 72 (West 2d ed. 2001).
56. J.F. O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25–26 (1991) (emphasis
added).
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For that reason, it was perhaps inevitable that jurisprudence of the
Church would converge with (and to some extent displace) the Roman
civil law:57 the pragmatic need for cooperation, combined with the “spiritual jurisprudence” then ascendant, assured that merchants would act
with some sense of mutual restraint in their dealings with one another.58
As a result, the merchant had to rely on standards of fairness, which
changed in accordance with commercial practice. The influence of canon
law is illustrated by the fact that by the sixteenth century, virtually every
commercial nation in Europe had altered prior doctrine and, in response
to the usages of the merchant class, recognized the enforceability of a
bona fide purchaser’s rights, the validity of sales confirmed by the payment of earnest money, the validity and enforceability of formless contracts, the negotiability of bills of exchange, the obligations of partners
and agents, and the necessity of swift justice ex aequo et bono.59 In each
of these respects, commercial habits and practices were transformed into
legal institutions, doctrines, and codes, with the result that the law was
increasingly uniform—even as it became increasingly cosmopolitan and
equitable.
The lex mercatoria was also distinguished by the ways that its norms
were enforced and commercial disputes were resolved. The dominant
mode of enforcement was the internalization of norms by entrepreneurs
themselves.60 One determinant of a merchant’s sustained prosperity was
his ability to conform to the expectations of the market, which were formalized only over time into law; there were concrete commercial consequences for any merchant insufficiently committed to the abstract standards of good faith that underlay the pragmatic doctrines in the law merchant. When internalization failed and disputes did arise, they were typically resolved by the merchants themselves through mercantile councils
and guilds or through informal, expeditious forms of mediation and arbitration—not by professional judges in the formal setting of a courtroom.
When a dispute became sufficiently serious or prolonged that the local
courts became involved, the law that governed was—directly or indi-

57. Id. at 26. See also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 190 (1970) (demonstrating that,
in the early medieval period, a “new and Christian tinge” came to color contractual obligations and commercial law generally).
58. TRAKMAN, supra note 50, at 7.
59. MITCHELL, supra note 53, at 157–58.
60. Cf. Harold H. Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203–06 (1996).
OF THE
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rectly—what the merchants had themselves adopted to facilitate ethical
and uniform trade practices.61
It will be noted that the lex mercatoria, in its original form, effectively
blurred the received distinction between self-interest and altruism. Adam
Smith fully understood the reinforcing dynamic between these two
forces; Smith is commonly invoked by advocates of laissez-faire capitalism who stress those passages in the Wealth of Nations that find the “invisible hand” in rational economic actors pursuing their self-interest.62
That emphasis however ignores the balance at work in Smith’s philosophy, especially in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, which focuses on
the innate sense of empathy with which human beings regulate their instinct for acquisitive self-interest.63 It radically oversimplifies Smith’s
theory of capitalism to suggest that individuals in natural or juristic form
are exempt from the dictates of conscience or equity; indeed (and perhaps counter-intuitively), the distinction between altruism and selfinterest cannot adequately account for the variance in commercial decision-making by individuals, by firms, and by nations. If it did, the ra-

61. MITCHELL, supra note 53, at 156; BERMAN & KAUFMAN, supra note 50, at 226–
27. For example:
Through the decisions of Lord Mansfield and his successors, there was created
a body of judicially declared English commercial law which incorporated and
refined rules developed in earlier times throughout Europe. The incorporation
of the law merchant added a cosmopolitan dimension to the English common
law, without which the common law courts could hardly have served the needs
of British commerce.
Id. at 226–27.
62. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976).

OF THE

WEALTH

OF

[The individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . [He] intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of
the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
his intention.
Id. See also Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene; The Many Faces of Adam Smith: Rediscovering ‘The Wealth of Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2001, at C2 (discussing Emma
Rothschild’s view that “Smith has been reinvented as a narrow, unyielding defender of
unfettered free enterprise”).
63. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 11 (1759) (“How selfish
soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”).
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tional breach of contracts would be nearly universal, and pacta sunt servanda would become the relic of a naïve age.
In sum, lex mercatoria comprised a body of authority that was (and
remains to this day) transnational in scope, grounded in good faith, reflective of market practices, and codified in the commercial law of the
various nations and in international law. Because these features reappear
in some emerging forms of commercial law in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries, these new pockets of law have been described as “a” or
“the” new lex mercatoria.64 But with consequences not yet fully appreciated by either the corporate community or the human rights community—let alone the academic community—the corporate human rights
standards described above offer fertile ground for the emergence of a
similarly stable and significant body of commercial standards.
It is clear at the threshold that the market-based initiatives described in
Part I reflect the apparent competitive advantages of establishing and
projecting a reputation for equitable conduct and a measure of transparency in corporate decision-making. The Kimberley Plan governing the
sale of conflict diamonds, the evolution of SA 8000, and the sale of
rights-sensitive product lines, inter alia, suggest that the market ultimately gives new relevance to international human rights standards in the
global economy. It would be neither unprecedented nor illegitimate if
what began as the articulation and internalization of best business practices became enforceable legal standards over time, either through domestic regulation, international standard-setting, or, in extraordinary circumstances, the prospect of civil liability. There is, in short, a critical
historical connection between best practices in the market and the rules
of law: “In all great matters relating to commerce, the legislators have
copied, not dictated.”65
CONCLUSION
One critique of this analysis rests on the truth that human rights standards are not yet common business conventions, let alone universal
norms. Nor are they conspicuously successful. Nor do they cement the
64. Examples include, among others, the law of cyberspace. See, e.g., Aron Mefford,
Note, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 211 (1997); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). Examples also include the norms adopted
in transnational arbitration panels. Harold J. Berman & Felix J. Dasser, The “New” Law
Merchant and the “Old”: Sources, Content, and Legitimacy, in LEX MERCATORIA AND
ARBITRATION 21 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
65. GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDELSRECHTS 378–79 (1891), quoted in Trakman, supra note 50, at 10.
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relationship among merchants through reciprocal assurances of commercial good faith. To the contrary, the principal beneficiary of these standards (and the “altruism” behind them) is not the mercantile community
itself; it is a labor force, a society, or even an idea. But the genetic
marker of the lex mercatoria was that seemingly soft notions like good
faith evolved into widely accepted standards—standards that became
some of the hardest commercial law there is and originated in the notion
that a merchant’s self-interest depended on his or her respect for the interests of others. In other words, at the substantive core of this supposedly private law were public values, and at the procedural core of what
became commercial law were voluntary undertakings of the merchant
class.66
It is in addition ahistorical to require that so new a development be
wholly formed before it can be taken seriously. In the synergistic dynamic that was the lex mercatoria, practices affected rules, which affected practices, which refined rules, and so on over the centuries. This
dynamic allowed a communal sense of fairness or equity to emerge and
get transformed into doctrinal form. That dynamic is again on display as
the business and legal culture changes in response to the four regimes of
principle and practice described above. It also suggests that the business
community and the human rights community might assist one another in
the articulation of a common sense of justice and the development of
legal standards to maximize the benefits of compliance at decreasing
marginal cost.
In short, human rights entrepreneurialism, the codes of conduct, the
ATS litigation in Unocal and its progeny, the work of groups like the
RiskMetrics Group,67 and the adoption of domestic and international legal norms reflect a partial, but very real, development at the intersection
of the law and the marketplace. Indeed, the corporate human rights initiative mirrors the two dominant faces of globalization: the expansion of
international trade and commerce without regard to boundaries and the
66. See Bank of Conway v. Stary, 200 N.W. 505, 508 (N.D. 1924). As stated by the
court:
The law merchant is a system of law that [did] not rest exclusively on the institutions and local customs of any particular country, but consists of certain principles of equity and usages of trade which general convenience and a common
sense of justice have established to regulate the dealings of merchants . . . in all
the commercial countries of the civilized world.
Id. at 508.
67. The RiskMetrics Group is a signatory to the United Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investment (“UNPRI”). Principles for Responsible Investment, http://www.unpri.
org/principles/ (last visited June 1, 2008).
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universalizing effects of the human rights movement—the only global
ideology to survive the twentieth century. Without suggesting that the
corporate culture is about to enter some millennial Age of Aquarius, we
will see the continued development of broad-based organizations specifically devoted to bringing human rights issues into the corporate boardroom, the modest growth of a consumer- and investor-driven market dynamic that embraces human rights concerns, the imposition of civil and
criminal liability in appropriate circumstances, and a continuing transformation in the work of human rights advocates, all of which reinforces
the insight that we must not think too simply about corporate decisionmaking, about human rights law, or about the received distinction between so-called public and so-called private law.

